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We examine the performance of mutual fund managers for a sample of Spanish mutual funds 
considering data on active management, loads, size and the number of funds managed per manager. 
We find evidence of differences in fund performance according to management: independent managers 
outperform their banking counterparts even when the lower associated fees are considered. Overall, 
our results suggest that superior active managers do exist and the slight discrepancies which arise 
between managers can be interpreted as agency problems. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In the context of mutual fund performance there is no clear evidence as to whether managers 
are able to add value. Results may differ for different methodologies or samples. The 
traditional evidence is that, on aggregate, performance is not significantly different from 
zero and in some cases is negative.  However, Puckett and Yan (2011) report different 
positions for and against managers’ skills in generating wealth and, among other studies, 
Rodriguez (2008) evidenced a positive added value for investors for a sample of European 
fund managers. Against this inconclusive background, this article focuses on the analysis of 
mutual fund performance relating active management to managers’ profiles and other 
characteristics.  
 
As the manager decision-making process is not easily observed, it is difficult to initially 
assess active management. Menkhoff and Schmidt (2005), Lütje (2009) and Menkhoff 
(2011) resolve this dilemma by directly asking managers in an attempt to capture their 
strategies and attitudes. However, as data on mutual fund results are more readily available, 
they are frequently used to infer active management. Hence, some studies have examined 
strategies and risk level of mutual funds: Flavin (2006), among others. Beyond the strategies 
followed by managers, agency problems have also been documented. One example is 
Mehran and Stulz’s (2007) comprehensive review on conflicts of interest in financial 
institutions. Chen et al. (2007) compare active funds managed by insurance companies with 
other mutual funds, finding that the former underperform the latter. Alves and Mendes 
(2010) find that mutual funds tend to overweight the stocks issued by their parent and 
underweight the stocks of competitors, thus eroding the performance of fund investors. In 
contrast, significant side effects stem from the conflict of interest between independent 
managers and investors, which occurs because of managers’ prioritizing career concerns 
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rather than shareholder interests [Kempf et al. (2009)]. In this context, we contribute to the 
literature by focusing on the profile of the professional manager −banking or independent− 
in mutual fund performance. Results show this role is related to the degree of active 
management of the portfolio and the loads charged to the fund. Manager profile could 
therefore be implemented as a key determinant in investors’ selection of mutual funds. 
 
 
II. Data and Performance Measurement 
 
The empirical analysis uses a sample of Spanish mutual funds from July 1998 to March 
2007. The sample is made up of all the domestic equity mutual funds with a net asset value 
during this period2. Following the Spanish Stock Market National Commission (CNMV), 
two types of funds can be distinguished: Balanced equity-bonds Funds (BF) and Equity 
Funds (EF). The daily return was calculated as the variation relative to the net asset value. 
Mutual funds data such as the net asset value, size and loads were provided by the CNMV. 
 
Performance is measured exogenously by the multifactor linear model [1], widely used in 
mutual fund literature, whose expression is:  
r pt=  p+
j
J
 pj r jt+  pt      [1] 
where rpt is the excess return, over the risk-free return, of portfolio p in period t. This return 
is adjusted to risk factors βpj with respect to rjt, the excess return of the benchmark j. Then, 
                                                          
2 The Spanish mutual fund industry essentially developed in the second half of the 1990s. For this reason, if we 
had selected an earlier starting date for the sample period, the number of funds in the sample would have been 
dramatically reduced. Thus, the use of daily data enables the possibility of analyzing a large volume of 
information for all the funds existing from 30th June 1998. 
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as an extended version of Jensen’s alpha, αp measures performance. Considering the nature 
of the mutual funds analysed, and to avoid benchmark omission bias (Matallin-Saez 2006), 
the following benchmarks are considered: the Ibex 35 index for broad stock investment, 
MSCI Spanish market index for Small Caps, Value and Growth styles, the AFI Government 




Panel 1 in Table 1 shows a summary of the results of the performance of mutual funds using 
model [1]. As in the previous literature, the aggregate performance is negative, or close to 
zero. Results for BF, with an annual average performance of -1.98%, are worse than for EF, 
at 0.04%. Moreover, results for EF funds are more dispersed, and comparing the data of the 
median and mean, the latter improves slightly due to the results of the best mutual funds on 
the right side of the distribution. 
 
We analyse the role of banking and independent managers in determining performance. 
Panel 2 of Table 1 shows the differences between the two for any type of fund. Banking 
managers handle approximately four times more mutual funds than independent managers. 
We use the chi-squared statistic to test the null hypothesis of independence between type of 
mutual fund and type of manager. The null hypothesis was not rejected (p-value=0.979); the 
difference in performance is therefore not driven by a heterogeneous distribution of BF and 
EF across manager type. The right side of panel shows how, for both types of funds, the 
performance of independent managers is better than that of banking managers; BF funds 
show a 1.26% annual improvement, and EF funds, 1.51%. Due to the different variance in 
performance distribution, instead of using a classic ANOVA test to analyse the significance 
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of the differences found, bootstrapping is applied. The results indicate that these differences 
are indeed significant.  
 
 Bearing in mind that independently managed funds achieve a better performance, we now 
analyse what inputs related to portfolio management could explain performance. The first 
one is the level of active management of the fund portfolio. Sharpe (1992) linked passive 
management to the fund’s style estimated in the model [1] and active management to 
tracking error. We therefore define the variable vp (active management) as the value of 1-R2, 
i.e., the percentage of residual variance in the model [1]. If a manager follows a passive 
(active) strategy, vp will be close to (far from) one. The second variable is lp (mutual fund 
loads). This is computed as the costs (from manager fees and turnover) over assets. 
Commonly, higher loads will erase performance for investors. Another variable considered 
in the literature is the size (sp) of the mutual fund [Beckers and Vaughan (2001) among 
others]. To avoid the bias reported by Matallin-Saez (2011), the size of a fund is measured 
in relative terms with regard to the total assets managed by all the funds at the beginning of 
the sample period. Lastly, np represents the number of mutual funds in the sample managed 
by the same managers. A low (high) number of funds managed could be inferred as a more 
concentrated (dispersed) management of these funds. For this variable, Hu and Chang 
(2008) find a negative relationship with respect to performance. Table 2 shows the mean of 
the values of these variables for each group of funds and type of managers. In general, BF 
are more actively managed and less expensive than EF. A comparison of banking and 
independent managed funds reveals that the former are more passive, somewhat larger in 
size, and their managers handle a higher number of funds. From this data and performance 
results, the model [2] is applied; where Dp is a dummy variable that takes the value of zero 
(one) for banking (independent) managed funds. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ppp44pp33pp22pp11pp +nD++sD++lD++vD++c= φφφφ      [2] 
 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating model [2]. From the results of γ1 and φ1 in both types 
of funds, active management is inferred to be significant only at the 1% level for the mutual 
funds managed by independents. But for EF the coefficient is 2.5 times higher than for BF 
funds. In other words, independent managers, on aggregate, add value to mutual funds 
through their active management, and this contribution is higher when they manage equity 
mutual funds, possibly because there are more strategies, risks and possibilities involved in 
investment in stock markets. On the other hand, a significant variable for both types of 
managers and funds are loads (γ2). As expected, it takes negative value, namely, loads erode 
performance. The result is clearly significant for BF funds (p-value<0.01), but somewhat 
lower for EF funds (p-value=0.091). Only for independent managers does the number of 
funds managed have a negative impact on performance. It is clearly significant for EF but on 
the border for BF. 
 
In sum, performance by independent managers is related positively to the level of active 
management, but negatively to the loads and the number of funds managed. It seems that, on 
aggregate, when managers are independent and centre their efforts on the managed portfolio, 
management adds value. However, banking managers appear to follow passive strategies 
(see Table 2) that do not add value and consequently only the loads charged are the most 
relevant variable to explain their underperformance.  
Overall, results demonstrate that superior active managers do exist and the slight 
discrepancies arising between managers can be interpreted as agency problems. The 
manager’s professional profile should be considered as a readily available source of 
  7 
information for the investor, providing ex ante evidence of the portfolio’s added value 
reported previously in the literature.   
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Table 1. Mutual fund sample and performance 
 
The table presents the results of the performance measured as αp in Model [1]. The sample period runs from June 
30 1998 to March 31 2007. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance estimator is by 
Newey and West (1987). The estimated coefficient αp is an annualized percentage.  
 
Panel 1 
   
 Number of Annualized performance in percentage 
Class. funds Mean Median Min. Max. S.d. 
BF 131 -1.98 -1.96 -7.25 6.90 2.16 
EF 74  0.04 -0.09 -7.98 10.33 2.89 
 
Panel 2 
   
 Number of funds Average annualized performance in percentage 
Class. Banking Independent Banking Independent Difference:  
Indep.-bank. (p-value) 
BF 106 25 -2.22 -0.96 1.26 (0.002) 
EF 59 15 -0.27 1.25 1.51 (0.042) 
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Table 2. Descriptive data of performance inputs and type of manager 
 
     











Active management 0.20 0.26 0.08 0.16 
Loads 1.92 1.68 2.04 2.12 
Size 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 
Number managed funds 5.66 2.16 6.15 2.53 
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Table 3. Performance inputs and type of manager 
 
  Balanced mutual funds (BF) Equity mutual funds (EF) 
Variable  Estimated Value  p-value Estimated Value p-value 
 cp -0.0054 (0.351) 0.0176 (0.159) 
Active management γ1 -0.0168 (0.218) 0.0037 (0.878) 
 φ1 0.0862 (0.007) 0.2207 (0.000) 
Loads γ2 -0.0068 (0.001) -0.0085 (0.091) 
 φ2 -0.0002 (0.969) 0.0063 (0.381) 
Size γ3 -0.2200 (0.368) -0.3298 (0.440) 
 φ3 0.8486 (0.211) 1.2559 (0.367) 
Number managed funds γ4 0.0002 (0.786) -0.0003 (0.742) 
 φ4 -0.0063 (0.102) -0.0158 (0.020) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
